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I agree with Professor Krabbe that there are deductive arguments and that deductive
arguments require a pragmatics that often includes the interpolation of suppressed premises.
For the sake of discussion, however, I want to emphasize some areas of disagreement in
the details of how Erik proposes to weave together deductive and pragmatic considerations in the
analysis of arguments in ordinary contexts and in philosophical applications. I would insist that
there is both an art and science of analyzing reasoning, and that the work of interpreting and
evaluating an argument is complex and interactive as between deductive and pragmatic factors.
A great deal is at stake in getting things right in the study of arguments, where part of what
complicates the analysis of arguments includes the analyzer’s own conceptual commitments and
limitations, philosophical presuppositions and prejudices, interests, values, and cultural
predispositions.
Let us, therefore, get down to cases. When Erik defines deductive arguments as ‘(single)
arguments that invite an evaluation in terms of deductive criteria, even though they may not
exclude the use of other criteria,’ I might be thoroughly in his camp, depending on how we try to
give specific content to what it means to invite an evaluation in terms of deductive criteria. An
invitation is always issued by someone who is in a position to receive something, although
admittedly the concept can also be used more loosely and metaphorically. In the case of
arguments, I would assume that the way in which an argument invites evaluation by deductive
criteria is by the argument author’s intending the argument to be assessed in this way. If this is
not true, and the invitation to apply deductive criteria rests instead with the evaluator, then I do
not think that the definition will not serve to distinguish reliably between deductive and — if
there are any — nondeductive arguments, since absolutely any argument can be evaluated by
deductive criteria and any evaluator can consider him or herself to be invited to evaluate the
argument in this way. In like fashion, if I am sufficiently obtuse or self-deceived, I might
consider myself to be invited to any interesting event in which I may want to participate; let us
say, to Queen Beatrix’s private birthday party. I might, in other words, freely invite myself, just
as I might freely invite myself to evaluate any given argument by specifically deductive criteria.
If that is all there is to an argument’s being deductive, then any and every argument is or could be
deductive, a conclusion that, as a deductivist myself, I would be happy to accept, but that I do not
think Erik would be willing to endorse.
I am puzzled in this regard by Erik’s further characterization of what he calls ‘the
simplest examples of deductive arguments’ as ‘those which are indeed deductively valid, and in
which the validity is obvious to all concerned.’ For I would have thought that such obvious
deductive fallacies as affirming the consequent or denying the antecedent were also equally
‘simple deductive arguments,’ albeit unsuccessful deductively invalid ones. They plainly do not
satisfy Erik’s definition, however, although they might well satisfy my description if the
arguments’ authors (mistakenly) intended the arguments to be deductively valid or such that they
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were supposed to be evaluated according to deductive criteria. Letting the chips fall where they
may on this conception, these fallacies are genuine deductive arguments despite being
deductively invalid. I think that any adequate definition of a deductive argument needs to reflect
the possibility that a deductive argument can turn out to be either deductively valid or invalid, a
possibility entailed by the invitation to evaluate such arguments according to standards of
deductive validity, as a criterion that only some but not all deductive arguments will satisfy.
Perhaps Erik and I are not so far apart on this issue, but I want to emphasize the difficulty of
characterizing the category of deductive arguments as a separate kind of argument form without
taking the argument author’s intentions into consideration, and in particular by making reference
only to what I would say is a rather vague concept of an argument (all by itself?) inviting
evaluation by deductive criteria.
Suppose, then, that we can lay our hands on a definite subset of all arguments that are
either properly deductive or appropriate for evaluation by deductive criteria. What should be the
interaction between deductive and pragmatic standards in the critical analysis of such arguments?
I am uncomfortable with the idea of stratifying deductive and pragmatic criteria in the way that
Erik reminds us Robert Ennis proposes. The idea of checking for deductive validity and
soundness first and accepting the argument if it passes these tests without further ado seems
wrong to me for several reasons that go beyond what Erik mentions.
There are in the first place other deductive criteria beyond validity and soundness, such as
deductive relevance and deductive noncircularity, that an argument must satisfy before we can
pronounce the argument satisfactory. For yet another more important reason, I would say, in
harmony with Erik’s reference to pragma-dialectical standards for evaluating arguments, that the
pragmatics of argument analysis pervade the study of arguments, from the standpoint of
determining an author’s intentions, placing it in context, interpreting its exact meaning or
content, as well as the identification in many if not most instances of appropriate suppressed
premises, in keeping not only with the principle of charity but of other sometimes conflicting
considerations as well, notably including contextual accuracy.
I think that an argument author’s intentions need to be taken very seriously into account
even if they are not always paramount in our interpretations of what an argument says or tries to
say or what kind of argument it is meant to be, before deciding whether or not the argument
succeeds. It is always possible for an author deliberately to put forward an argument that cannot
be plausibly charitably interpreted, but, as we must sometimes say, is an irredeemably out and out
bad argument. But since pragmatics are deeply involved at every stage of argument analysis, I
am reluctant to consider pragmatic and deductive criteria as constituting distinct levels of
argument analysis, as though we could prioritize these in a definitive way by which we can check
them off seriatim as we evaluate an argument’s strengths and weaknesses. I think that as we
evaluate an argument’s deductive potential we are dealing with pragmatic factors through and
through at every stage and in a dialectical fashion that sends us back and forth from questions of
validity to questions of interpretation, meaning and intent, and back to validity, again and again.
The process involves a kind of upward spiral of refinement as we bring an argument under
analysis into sharper focus, and our understanding of its exact content into what John Rawls in
another context refers to as reflective equilibrium, until we finally stand ready to pronounce it
satisfactory or unsatisfactory on the basis of deductive or other criteria.
Thus, I am somewhat at odds with Erik when he argues: ‘Consequently, there is nothing
wrong with Ennis’ proposal to start evaluation at the logical level, that is to say by a set of
deductive criteria. If that leads to a positive result, the opponent should give up criticism directed
at the cogency of the argument’ [my emphases]. I have several difficulties with this: (1) As I
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have indicated, I do not accept a clean division between deductive or logical and pragmatic
considerations in the evaluation of an argument, and I think that the process of argument
evaluation as a result is structurally much more complex. (2) I do not have a clear sense of what
Erik means by an argument’s ‘cogency,’ a term he uses in several places but without attempt at
definition or explanation. Erik remarks that it involves an argument’s inferential ‘force,’ but this
term itself in this context requires further clarification. Finally, but perhaps more revealingly, (3)
I think that whether or not an opponent of an argument should ‘give up criticism’ directed at an
argument’s cogency depends very much on what we find it in our interests to do with an
argument. By this I mean to emphasize again the extent to which I regard pragmatic
considerations as indispensable to the analysis of argumentation and deeply integrated into its
methods of evaluation. If our only purpose in evaluating an argument is to decide whether or not
to add its conclusion to our beliefs, then perhaps it is enough as Ennis says to judge whether or
not the argument is sound. But if, for example, we need or want to apply or build something on
the argument’s conclusions, then we may need to further criticize its significance, including not
only its circularity or noncircularity, as already mentioned, but also its relevance, rhetorical
effect, persuasiveness, and many other things besides, all of which are unmistakably matters of
pragmatic evaluation. It may not always be enough to bring the critical analysis of an argument
to a halt when it has passed the tests of logic in its deductive validity and soundness.
As a final illustration of these themes concerning the complex interrelation between
deductive and pragmatic considerations in the interpretation and evaluation of arguments, permit
me to consider in more detail a reconstruction of the philosophical reasoning Erik discusses from
Plato’s dialogue the Protagoras. Erik symbolizes the underlying deductive structure of Socrates’
inference in the following way, demonstrating his commitment to pragma-dialectical methods in
the interpolation of suppressed assumptions in what appears to be an informally composed
enthymeme. Erik offers us this symbolization:
1.
f = cw
[the factor that causes cowardice makes one a coward]
2.
f=e
[error is the factor makes one a coward (causes one to fear)]
_____________________
3.
cw = e
(1-2 Leibniz’s Law; transitivity of identity) [cowardice is error]
4.
Opposite(cr,cw)
[courage and cowardice are opposites]
5.
Opposite(w,e)
[wisdom and error are opposites]
6.
[No object has more than one opposite]
[suppressed premise]
_____________________
7.
w = cr
(3-6) [courage is wisdom]
I think that Erik’s partial formalization is insightful, but I want to take issue with several
of its main features. For example, I do not understand the justification for using identity in
assumptions (1) and (2) as a way of symbolizing the relation of which Plato speaks.
Socrates refers to the factor (f) that makes someone a coward (cw); he does not say that to
be a coward or cowardly is identical with that factor. If we argue on Erik’s behalf that the
property of cowardice or of being cowardly is identical with the factor that makes someone a
coward, as a way of upholding assumption (1), we cannot as easily do the same with respect to
assumption (2). For whereas it might be true as Socrates maintains that error makes or causes
one to possess the factor that makes one a coward, it does not at all seem true to say that error is
identical with or the same thing as fear.
What are such factors? They are presumably something either mental or extramental. If
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they are extramental, then they cannot easily be identified with cowardice or being a coward, as
assumption (1) in Erik’s symbolization requires, since being a coward seems to be something at
least partly psychological. If the cowardice-inducing factors are mental, on the other hand, then
they cannot easily be identified with error, as assumption (2) requires, if, as seems correct, error
involves a belief that does not positively correspond with conditions in the world as they actually
obtain, and hence with something at least partly psychological. Moreover, there are plenty of
instances of error about what is to be feared or not to be feared that are by no means instances of
fear, and for that matter that do not even appear to cause or bring about a state of fear; such as
falsely believing that prime numbers are to be feared. There are also innumerable actual things to
fear, genuine reasons to be cowardly, that do not seem to involve any sort of cognitive error.
Nor is the use of identity innocuous here where perhaps some kind of causal predication
is required instead, since if we pragmatically interpret Socrates’ assertion differently than Erik
we no longer have any deductively sound basis for inferring proposition (3) from (1) and (2), by
Leibniz’s Law, as Erik claims, or by any other validity-preserving principle, such as transitivity
of identity, since in that case we will not be dealing throughout with strict identities. The
discrepancy should cause us to rethink whether or not the conclusion in (3) is rightly expressed as
an identity, especially in light of the fact that the same kinds of counterexamples undermine the
proposition that cowardice is simply identical with error about what is or is not to be feared.
I think, as a result, that Erik is correct to identify pragmatically at least one of Socrates’
suppressed assumptions, but that this is not enough to sustain his inference as deductively valid.
Whether or not there exists a plausible symbolization by which Socrates’ argument in the
Protagoras turns out to be deductively correct is very much a pragmatic matter of interpreting
context, content, and intent, without which we cannot even get started in the analysis of
argumentation, and to which we must return again and again in evaluating an argument’s merits
and defects. How, in this interesting case to which Erik calls our attention, are we to decide
whether Socrates presents Protagoras with a valid deduction to prove that courage is identical
with wisdom, or an outrageous fallacy by which he browbeats his interlocutor with a subtle but
ultimately defective reasoning of the sort he is often accused of perpetrating? How are we to
determine whether Socrates’ offers a deductively valid specimen of reasoning in the dialogue, or
an argument that with equal justice we might criticize as embodying the following evidently
fallacious form: Being American (a citizen of the United States of America) makes someone
North American; being Canadian (a citizen of Canada) makes someone North American;
therefore, being American makes someone Canadian. The pragmatics of interpretation as a
propadeutic to the proper evaluation even of what may appear obviously to be an argument’s real
deductive structure, are pervasive, inescapable and always disputable in ongoing argumentation
and dialectical exchange. This requirement in turn discredits the judging of an argument’s
deductive validity as a first ‘level’ of analysis prior to raising pragmatic considerations.
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